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We’re the advocates for the salmon, the animals, the birds, the 
water.  We’re the advocates for the food chain.  We’re an 
advocate for all of society.  Tell them . . . how they’re our 
neighbors.  And how you have to respect your neighbors and 
work with your neighbors.1 
Since the establishment of the United States, the interests of 
tribes and states have repeatedly landed at opposite sides of the 
debate podium.2  Much of this debate surrounds the 
establishment of treaties and the duties and rights that arise 
under such treaties.3  Whereas tribes generally hold their treaties 
in high regard as a reminder of their entitlements, many states 
regard those same treaties as thorns in their collective sides.4  
Not surprisingly, states and tribes have called on the federal 
courts to interpret whether state actions have been in line with 
the duties imposed under these treaties.5 
The frequency of these disputes has constantly increased, and 
while the subject of the debate changes ever so often, the 
underlying question perseveres: Are states fulfilling their treaty-
imposed duties?  In order to answer this question, courts find 
themselves delineating the states’ duties under these treaties.  
The question then becomes whether the duties delineated by the 
courts are broad enough to encompass those rights and duties 
actually created or reserved by the treaties. 
Today, the subject of much of this debate is the tribal right to 
the limited natural resources of the Pacific Northwest–
specifically, hunting and fishing rights.  During the last thirty 
years, the State of Washington has been involved in extensive 
litigation with Indian tribes (with the United States acting as 
trustee for the tribes) regarding fishing rights and the quality of 
 
1 CHARLES WILKINSON, MESSAGES FROM FRANK’S LANDING: A STORY OF 
SALMON, TREATIES, AND THE INDIAN WAY 103–04 (2000) (quoting native 
fisherman, Billy Frank, Jr.). 
2 See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831). 
3 See, e.g., Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel 
Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979). 
4 See, e.g., id. 
5 See, e.g., United States v. Washington (Phase II Trial), 506 F. Supp. 187 (W.D. 
Wash. 1980), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 759 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. 
denied, 474 U.S. 994 (1985). 
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fish runs throughout the Northwest.6  While much of this 
litigation regards tribal fishing rights in the face of state fishing 
regulations, few cases have specifically touched on a state’s duty 
to protect fish runs and fish habitat.7 
This duty is an issue of great importance for Northwest tribes.  
Several exterior forces have affected tribes’ abilities to harvest 
fish.  Quantities of fish have dropped due to construction of 
roads and bridges, and dams have also continued to deplete fish 
runs.8  Whereas such changes may be little noticed by non-Indian 
society, the lack of fish for tribes changes basic aspects of tribal 
life.  In fact, there is very little in non-Indian society to which 
one can compare the catching and eating of fish for tribes.  
Eating fish, specifically salmon, is such a large part of native life 
for Northwest tribes it can even be said to be a tribal sacrament.9  
Salmon is so central to many native cultures that one tribal 
leader stated: “It is almost impossible to describe in words the 
pain and suffering this has caused my people.  We have been 
fishermen for thousands of years.  It is our life, not just our 
economy.”10  When fish are depleted from the rivers such that a 
tribe loses its ability to take fish or fish become so affected by 
toxins that tribes can no longer safely consume accustomed 
amounts of fish, the tribes find themselves turning to the courts 
for assistance.  This is the predicament in which Northwest tribes 
now find themselves situated. 
 
6 United States v. Washington (Phase I Trial), 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 
1974); United States v. Washington (Phase I Appeal), 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), 
aff’g Phase I Trial, 384 F. Supp. 312; Phase II Trial, 506 F. Supp. 187; United States 
v. Washington (Phase II Appeal), 694 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. 
Washington (Phase II Appeal Rehearing), 759 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1985); United 
States v. Washington (Culverts Opinion), No. C70-9213, Subproceeding No. 01-1, 
2007 WL 2437166 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 22, 2007). 
7 See, e.g., Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass’n v. U.S. Dist. Court, 573 F.2d 1123 (9th 
Cir. 1978), aff’d in part, vacated in part, and remanded sub nom., Fishing Vessel 
Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658. 
8 See Mary Christina Wood, The Tribal Property Right to Wildlife Capital (Part 
I): Applying Principles of Sovereignty to Protect Imperiled Wildlife Populations, 37 
IDAHO L. REV. 1, 2, 10 (2001) (citing to testimony of Warm Springs Reservation 
tribal member that current tribal catch is only one one-hundredth of its historical 
number). 
9 See id. at 2–3. (“[T]he Salmon Ceremonies . . . celebrate the holy return of the 
fish to their natal waters.”). 
10 Id. at 3 n.4 (citing testimony of Chairman Antone Minthorn, a tribal leader, 
before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations on July 19, 1994). 
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The question becomes: Do treaties involve an affirmative duty 
for states to protect fish habitat and ensure quality fish runs?  As 
discussed herein, a federal court has answered this question 
narrowly, yet affirmatively, failing to employ a property-based 
construct that encompasses all the rights reserved under the 
tribal treaties.11  Therefore, although the courts have recognized 
the existence of a duty, they have not yet recognized its entire 
scope. 
Many theories have been advanced for how courts should 
interpret a state’s duties to protect fish habitat.  Generally, 
treaty-invoked duties are analyzed under a contract-law 
paradigm.12  This is not erroneous, as treaties are said to be 
“contract[s] between sovereign nations.”13  However, when 
courts look at treaties only as contracts, they are missing one 
major aspect of tribal treaties: property rights.  Not only are 
tribal treaties contracts between sovereigns, they are also deeds 
of property.14  Therefore, the bodies of law that are invoked by 
the formation of a tribal treaty include both contract law and 
property law.  However, despite the promising answers property 
law provides for treaty interpretation,15 many judges have shown 
discomfort at the idea of applying property-based constructs to 
interpret states’ and tribes’ duties and rights under such 
treaties.16  Some feel that the formalistic rules of property law do 
not contain enough elasticity to be molded within the Indian law 
context.17  For example, when the Ninth Circuit used a property-
law analogy to enforce tribes’ rights to take fish from the 
Columbia River, Judge Kennedy concurred in the holding but 
objected to the court’s use of this analogy, arguing that it was not 
an exact fit.18  What Judge Kennedy failed to recognize was that 
 
11 Culverts Opinion, 2007 WL 2437166. 
12 See, e.g., United States v. Washington (Phase II Appeal), 694 F.2d 1374 (9th 
Cir. 1982). 
13 ELIZABETH FURSE, THE INSTITUTE FOR TRIBAL GOVERNMENT, INDIAN 
TRIBES, THEIR RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 3 (1999), available at http://www 
.tribalgov.pdx.edu/pdfs/tribal_rights_handbook.pdf. 
14 Wood, supra note 8, at 36. 
15 See id. at 5–6. 
16 See Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass’n v. U.S. Dist. Court, 573 F.2d 1123, 1134 (9th 
Cir. 1978) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
17 See id. 
18 See id. 
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courts can and should apply the basic models of a property-
based construct to analyze treaty rights, even where every jot 
and tittle may not line up.  Refusing to do so is to turn a blind 
eye to the fact that treaties are deeds of property, and as such, 
invoke the rules of property law. 
This Note discusses one recent significant district court 
opinion regarding treaty-imposed duties for state fish habitat 
protection and advocates for the use of a broader, property-
based construct for future treaty interpretations. 
I 
THE CULVERTS OPINION: THE EVER ON-GOING 
UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON 
Early nineteenth century America was a time for exploration 
and settlement of the West.  The famous explorers Meriwether 
Lewis and William Clark were chosen by Thomas Jefferson to 
trek through the property purchased from France in the 
transaction known as the Louisiana Purchase.19  Their journey 
was only the beginning trickle of an eventual deluge of settlers to 
the area later called the Oregon Territory.20  By the time the 
1850s rolled around, the guiding principle of Manifest Destiny21 
began to have a significant effect on western Washington.22  
Whereas America’s 1818 treaty with England had maintained an 
understanding that Americans would stay south of the Columbia 
River, with England in control of the north.23  In 1846, England 
ceded control of what is now the State of Washington, giving 
Americans a free pass to head north.24  This resulted in a 
perpetual increase of settlers into the Puget Sound basin and 
 
19 See WASHINGTONIANS: A BIOGRAPHICAL PORTRAIT OF THE STATE 12 
(David Brewster & David M. Buerge eds., 1988). 
20 See id. at 74. 
21 The doctrine of Manifest Destiny was originally used as a slogan for the 
expansionists to rationalize the continued westward expansion of the United States 
and the annexation of Texas.  It was supported by the belief that the United States 
was destined to span from the Atlantic to the Pacific.  See Manifest Destiny: The 
Dragoon Expeditions, The National Park Service Fort Scott National Historic Site, 
http://www.nps.gov/archive/fosc/mandest.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2009). 
22 WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 8. 
23 Convention with Great Britain, U.S.-Eng., Oct. 20, 1818, 8 Stat. 248. 
24 See Treaty with Great Britain, In Regard to Limits Westward of the Rocky 
Mountains, U.S.-Eng., June 15, 1846, 9 Stat. 869. 
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soon the town of Olympia and the Nisqually River Valley 
became central locations for shipping and agriculture.25  In 1853, 
Congress staked the borders of the Washington Territory out of 
Oregon and began to prepare the area for eventual statehood, 
which did not take place until 1889.26  Although these changes 
brought growth and progress, “they brought mostly woe” to the 
tribal people in the area.27 
A.  Treaty Establishment 
In order to prepare the area for settlement and statehood, one 
main roadblock needed to be removed–Northwest tribes.  The 
dispersed nature of the tribes made it very difficult to plan for 
progress such as roads and railroads.28  Moreover, while 
American settlers had claimed land under the Donation Land 
Act of 1850, much of that land was still claimed by the Indians, 
and aboriginal title had not yet been extinguished.29  Thus, in 
order to forestall violence between Indians and non-Indian 
settlers, one of the preparations thought necessary was the 
establishment of treaties with Indian tribes, with the hope of 
bringing them onto reservations.30  In 1854, Isaac Stevens, 
governor of the Territory of Washington and superintendent of 
Indian affairs, began to hold treaty councils with tribes across 
the state, eventually meeting eight different times with tribes 
from the Puget Sound all the way to the confluence of the Judith 
and Missouri Rivers near present day Great Falls, Montana.31  
One of Stevens’ aims was to “smooth the way for settlement by 
inducing the Indians of the area to move voluntarily onto 
 
25 WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 9. 
26 Keith A. Murray, Statehood for Washington, COLUMBIA: THE MAG. OF N.W. 
HIST., Winter 1988–89, at 30, available at http://stories.washingtonhistory.org/ 
Carriker/columbia/articles/0488-a1.htm. 
27 WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 9. 
28 United States v. Washington (Phase I Appeal), 520 F.2d 676, 682 (9th Cir. 
1975). 
29 See WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 9–10; see also United States v. Washington 
(Phase I Trial), 384 F. Supp. 312, 355 (W.D. Wash. 1974). 
30 Phase I Appeal, 520 F.2d at 682. 
31 Kent Richards, The Stevens Treaties of 1854–1855, 106 OR. HIST. Q. 342, ¶ 2 
(2005), available at http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/ohq/106.3/richards 
.html. 
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reservations.”32  Such a move allowed Stevens to extinguish 
aboriginal title to a significant portion of the land, establish the 
best possible lines for roads and railroads, and establish a 
government and economy stable enough for the population to 
grow and thrive in this portion of the country.33 
Apparently, Stevens was no novice in the work he set out to 
perform.  Records indicate that he was a “tactful and effective 
negotiator.”34  Rather than negotiating with someone chosen by 
the tribes, Stevens united several Indian communities into 
“tribes” and selected one “chief” from each “tribe” with whom 
he negotiated directly.35  However, what really set Stevens apart 
as a negotiator was that he apparently understood the culture 
and lives of Indians who lived in this part of the territory.  They 
were known as the “fish-eaters,” a name reflecting that their 
diets, social customs, and religion all centered around capturing 
fish.36  Their fish-based culture and the nature of varying fish 
runs that changed with the seasons meant that these tribes were 
mostly nomadic, moving from one spot to another, essentially 
responding to the ebbs in fish runs.37  As territorial leaders saw it, 
this cultural aspect of the tribes stood in the way of white 
progress and conflicted with the white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant 
ideal of permanent residence and agrarian life.38  Convincing the 
tribes to settle in a permanent location would be pivotal in 
Stevens’ plan for settlement of the territory and assimilation of 
the tribes39 but would come at a high price.  Stevens, using a 
certain amount of violence, eventually convinced the tribes to 
settle down on reservations, thereby freeing up the needed land 
for settlement.40  To reach such an end, Stevens promised the 
tribes several things: (1) money; (2) the benefits of the white 
man’s goods, education, and civilization; and most importantly, 
 
32 Phase I Appeal, 520 F.2d at 682. 
33 Richards, supra note 31, at ¶ 8. 




38 See Katheleen R. Guzman, Give or Take an Acre: Property Norms and the 
Indian Land Consolidation Act, 85 IOWA L. REV. 595, 650 (2000). 
39 See Richards, supra note 31, at ¶ 12. 
40 WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 14–18. 
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(3) “[t]he right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed” 
fishing places “in common” with the white settlers.41 
The treaties themselves were written in English and although 
few Indians understood English, the negotiators proceeded to 
read aloud, in English, the treaty language for the Indians’ 
commentary and endorsement.42  Moreover, the treaties read 
like formal legal documents,43 thereby creating obvious 
comprehension barriers for the tribes.  Attempting to mitigate 
the problem, territorial negotiators translated the treaties and 
their explanations thereof into a trade jargon common to the 
Northwest tribes.44  However, this translation was adequate only 
to explain the basic nature of the treaty promises.45 
To the tribes, the right of taking fish, reserved by six of the 
treaties Stevens negotiated during this period, was the most 
important of all the treaty clauses.46  It meant that the tribes were 
only confined to the reservations in terms of residence but were 
free to take fish from other places, as they were accustomed.  
Stevens knew the tribes would never sign without this promise.47  
Moreover, it is likely that Stevens’ self-interest was at play here 
as well.48  Fishing would sustain the tribes, in turn decreasing the 
U.S. government’s responsibility to provide for them.49  The 
fishing right was only limited by an agreement by the tribes to 
 
41 Treaty with the Nisqualli, Puyallup, etc., art. 3–5, Dec. 26, 1854, 10 Stat. 1132 
[hereinafter Treaty of Medicine Creek]. 
The Treaty of Medicine Creek was signed on December 26, 1854, at a 
meeting at Medicine Creek in present-day Thurston County.  Sixty-two 
leaders of major Western Washington tribes, including the Nisqually and 
Puyallup, signed the treaty with Territorial Governor Isaac Stevens (1818–
1862).  The tribes ceded most of their lands in exchange for $32,500, 
designated reservations, and the permanent right of access to traditional 
hunting and fishing grounds. 
Walt Crowley, Treaty of Medicine Creek, 1854, http://www.historylink.org/essays/ 
output.cfm?file_id=5253 (last visited Jan. 3, 2009). 




46 United States v. Washington (Phase II Trial), 506 F. Supp. 187, 190 (W.D. 
Wash. 1980). 
47 WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 12. 
48 See id. 
49 Id. 
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“not take shellfish from any beds staked or cultivated by 
citizens”50 and was therefore seemingly unlimited in its 
application to the right of tribes to take salmon from their 
traditional fishing grounds.  Whether Washington officials ever 
really recognized this tribal right is unclear.  However, by 1945 it 
was apparent that Washington officials would refuse to 
recognize any special position of the tribes’ right to fish.51 
B.  Litigation Ensues 
1.  Phase I 
Just before Christmas, 1945, little more than ninety years after 
the Stevens Treaties were signed, Billy Frank, Jr., a native 
fisherman, was arrested as he began cleaning the fish he had just 
pulled from an area of the Nisqually River called Frank’s 
Landing.52  This arrest, along with the approximately fifty others 
that Billy experienced over the next thirty years, put Billy at the 
head of what has become one of the most drawn out treaty 
disputes in American history.53 
During this period, the supply of fish in Washington’s rivers 
began to feel the negative effects of several exterior forces: 
commercial gillnetting54 increased exponentially, sport fishing 
experienced a resurgence among returning World War II 
veterans, hydroelectricity found a permanent home on the fast-
moving rivers of the Cascades, and the baby boom put pressures 
on natural resources as the logging industry boosted its 
harvesting activities.55  As the State increased its fishing 
regulations to protect salmon runs on the Nisqually and other 
nearby rivers, it also began to insist that tribes were subject to 
the same license regulations and take limits as non-Indians.56  
When Indian fishermen continued to fish as normal, the State 
 
50 Treaty of Medicine Creek, supra note 41. 
51 WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 4. 
52 Id. 
53 See id. 
54 Gillnet fishing is a type of fishing using nets of varying size and thickness.  It is 
one traditional manner of fishing.  Gillnet fishing can be very effective in catching 
large numbers of fish and is therefore closely regulated. 
55 WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 30–31. 
56 Id. at 31. 
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followed up with a law enforcement campaign consisting mostly 
of “raids and stings” designed to catch tribal fishermen in the 
act.57  The State saw the conduct of Indian fishermen as lawless, 
perverse, and as the causal reason for the decrease in salmon 
runs.58  The tribes refused to step down–after all, they and their 
ancestors had been fishing these rivers for over five thousand 
years59–and soon the number of Indian fishermen arrests began 
to increase. 
In the early 1960s, the State mounted a raid on tribal 
fishermen that would last for over a decade, flaring up during the 
salmon runs and then subsiding, only to repeat itself the next 
season.60  Life at Frank’s landing during this time was 
hyperactive, white hot.  The surveillance was continuous. . . .  
 The game wardens – a dozen to more than fifty – would 
descend the banks in a stone-faced scramble toward a few 
Nisqually men in a canoe or skiff unloading salmon from a 
gillnet.  Usually the Nisqually would give passive resistance –
dead weight – and five officers or more would drag the men 
up the rugged banks toward the waiting vehicles.  The dragging 
often got rough, with much pushing and shoving, many arms 
twisted way up the back, and numerous cold-cock punches.  
The billy clubs made their thuds.  Sometimes the Indian men 
struck back.61 
And strike back they did.  In September 1970, the treaty tribes 
of western Washington and the United States, acting as trustee 
for the tribes, filed a complaint in U.S. District Court for the 
Western District of Washington.62  In what would become known 
as Phase I of the United States v. Washington litigation, tribal 
attorneys set out to argue against any state regulation over treaty 
fishing and to ensure a significant share of the fish for the 
tribes.63  Although tribal attorneys originally did not argue to 




59 Id. at 19. 
60 Id. at 34. 
61 Id. at 38. 
62 United States v. Washington (Phase I Trial), 384 F. Supp. 312, 327 (W.D. 
Wash. 1974). 
63 WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 51. 
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floated the idea of a fifty-fifty split but did not push the issue 
much.64  The attorneys for the United States were not convinced 
this was a position supported by case law and doubted whether it 
was something Judge Boldt would be willing to grant.65  Just one 
year prior, the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon 
held that tribes were to be allocated a “fair share” of the 
harvestable salmon in the Columbia River.66  U.S. attorneys 
thought it would be sufficient to pursue a similar ruling in 
Washington.67  However, by the end of the trial, the federal 
attorneys were arguing for a fifty percent allocation and the 
tribes were separately arguing that no exact quota should be 
set.68  They argued that tribes should be guaranteed enough fish 
to meet tribal needs, regardless of the size of their take.69 
In the fall of 1973, United States v. Washington went to trial.70  
For a month, Judge Boldt heard testimony from tribal 
members.71  Billy Frank himself testified of his many arrests and 
confiscations of his fishing gear.72  Tribal elders testified, 
recounting the history that had been handed down to them of 
how their ancestors centered their lives around the river and the 
fish.73  Not surprisingly, the decision that was handed down by 
the court focused on tribal fishing as a matter of “subsistence 
and cultural identity” and how it “provides an important part of 
[tribal] livelihood.”74  Judge Boldt also placed significant 
emphasis on the facts surrounding the treaty negotiations, 
explaining that “[a]t the treaty negotiations, a primary concern 
of the Indians whose way of life was so heavily dependent upon 
harvesting anadromous fish, was that they have freedom to move 
about to gather food, particularly salmon.”75  In February of 
 
64 Id. at 52. 
65 Id. at 53. 
66 Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899, 911 (D. Or. 1969). 
67 WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 53. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 




74 United States v. Washington (Phase I Trial), 384 F. Supp. 312, 357 (W.D. 
Wash. 1974). 
75 Id. at 355. 
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1974, Judge Boldt produced his final decision; one of the most 
important decisions for Northwest tribes.76  He ruled for the 
tribes on almost all accounts but most importantly on the fifty-
fifty allocation.77  Judge Boldt based this decision on his 
interpretation of the three words, “in common with,” from the 
Stevens Treaties, to mean that both Indians and non-Indians 
must equally share the “opportunity to take fish.”78  Therefore, 
both non-treaty fishermen and treaty fishermen must each have 
an equal opportunity to the fish.  That is, the opportunity to take 
up to fifty percent of the harvestable number of fish. 
Judge Boldt and his allocation decision came under intense 
scrutiny after the trial ended.  Routinely, U.S. marshals were 
called on to remove effigies of Judge Boldt, with nooses around 
their necks, from the front lawns of the federal courthouse.79  
Enforcing the decision, however, was even more difficult and 
dangerous, as vigilantes and rogue fishermen held “fish-ins” to 
protest the Boldt decision.80  Judge Boldt, however, held firm in 
his decision, eventually issuing hundreds of post-trial 
enforcement orders.81 
In 1975, the State and its commercial and sport fishing 
supporters appealed Judge Boldt’s decision to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.82  After hearing oral arguments, 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Boldt decision.83  The Ninth 
Circuit, however, focused a significant portion of its ruling on the 
question of when, if ever, may the state regulate the fish-take of 
tribes.84  Judge Boldt had limited the state’s right to regulate 
Indians’ off-reservation fishing to whatever measures “are 
reasonable and necessary to the perpetuation of a particular run 
or species of fish.”85  In its analysis of this issue, the court 
 
76 WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 55–56. 
77 Phase I Trial, 384 F. Supp. at 343. 
78 Id. 
79 WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 58–61. 
80 Id. at 58. 
81 Id. 
82 United States v. Washington (Phase I Appeal), 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975). 
83 Id. at 693. 
84 See id. at 686–87. 
85 United States v. Washington (Phase I Trial), 384 F. Supp. 312, 342 (W.D. 
Wash. 1974). 
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analogized the state’s and tribes’ related interests in the fish to a 
cotenancy interest in that “[e]ach has the right to full enjoyment 
of the property”; both parties “stand in a fiduciary relationship 
one to the other”; and, like cotenants, each “is liable for waste if 
he destroys the property or abuses it so as to permanently impair 
its value.”86  The court continued, “neither the treaty Indians nor 
the state on behalf of its citizens may permit the subject matter 
of these treaties to be destroyed.”87  While the State asserted its 
goals for conservation and argued that it should be able to 
restrain Indian fishing in pursuit of attainment of such goals, the 
court further explained that although the State’s conservation 
program appeared commendable, the State needed to realize 
that it shared its interest in the fish with another sovereign 
party.88  Therefore, the State could not force the tribes to give up 
their sovereign rights in the fish in order to promote the interests 
of the state’s non-Indian citizens.89  In pursuit of its conservation 
goals, the State must do its best by regulating non-Indian fishing 
interests and “only after the state has proved unable to preserve 
a run by forbidding the catching of fish by other citizens” may 
the State directly regulate Indian fishing.90  This was clearly not 
the outcome hoped for by the State, and it was promptly 
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which then denied 
certiorari.91  Judge Boldt’s decision was the law of the land. 
2.  Phase II 
As part of the Phase I litigation, the United States and the 
tribes originally asserted additional claims for relief from 
activities, such as logging, pollution, and obstruction of streams 
 
86 Phase I Appeal, 520 F.2d at 685. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 685–86. 
89 Id. at 686. 
90 Id. 
91 See Washington v. United States, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976).  A related case, 
Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 
658 (1979), involved the issue of state compliance with the federal court’s order.  It 
was the culmination of some state court claims and brought after the Boldt decision 
was handed down.  See id. at 662.  The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, and 
found itself essentially ruling on the validity of Judge Boldt’s decision and the Ninth 
Circuit’s affirmation of that decision.  See id. at 696.  The Supreme Court’s holding 
affirms Judge Boldt’s allocation ruling with slight modifications.  See United States 
v. Washington (Phase II Trial), 506 F. Supp. 187, 193 (W.D. Wash. 1980). 
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that caused environmental damage to the fisheries (for example, 
loss of fish and damage to fish habitat).92  However, in the 
interest of simplifying their arguments, the parties agreed to 
reserve the “environmental issues” for decision in a later phase 
of the case.93  Phase II, which considered this issue, began in 
1976, several months after the Supreme Court denied certiorari 
in Phase I.94  The tribes and the United States, once again acting 
as trustee, eventually moved for summary judgment on the issue 
of whether the treaty fishing right, established by the Stevens 
Treaties, includes a right to have the fishery resource protected 
from damaging environmental actions “or inactions” of the 
state.95  The court found that over the preceding years there had 
been a “gradual deterioration and loss” of fish and fish habitat in 
Washington.96 
Recognizing the right to “take fish” as the central cornerstone 
of the Stevens Treaties, District Court Judge Orrick granted 
summary judgment in favor of the tribes, holding that “implicitly 
incorporated in the treaties’ fishing clause is the right to have the 
fishery habitat protected from man-made despoliation.”97  Were 
fish habitat degradation to continue, “the right to take fish 
would eventually be reduced to the right to dip one’s net into the 
water . . . and bring it out empty.”98  The U.S. Supreme Court 
had already clearly stated that treaty fishing rights include much 
more than this.99  Such reasoning is further supported by the 
intentions of Stevens and his fellow negotiators to populate and 
develop this portion of western Washington, while “assur[ing] 
the tribes that they could continue to fish notwithstanding the 
changes that the impending western expansion would certainly 
entail.”100 
 
92 United States v. Washington (Phase I Trial), 384 F. Supp. 312, 328 (W.D. 
Wash. 1974). 
93 Phase II Trial, 506 F. Supp. at 191. 
94 Id. at 194. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 203. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 See Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 
443 U.S. 658, 679 (1979) (stating that the treaty fishing clause gives tribes more than 
“merely the chance . . . occasionally to dip their nets into the territorial waters”). 
100 Phase II Trial, 506 F. Supp. at 204. 
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Although the tribes were elated to receive such a judgment, 
their elation lasted only a short time.  Sure enough, the Ninth 
Circuit agreed to hear the appeal of Judge Orrick’s decision, and 
just over two years later, a three-judge panel reversed the 
decision, holding that the Stevens Treaties do not “create an 
absolute right to relief from” any and all environmental 
degradation of fish habitat that interrupts the tribes’ fishing 
rights.101  However, the panel did not completely dismiss the 
issue as conclusively as this language might suggest.102  The 
opinion’s conclusion stated: 
Let us repeat the essence of our interpretation of the treaty.  
Although we reject the environmental servitude created by the 
district court, we do not hold that the State of Washington and 
the Indians have no obligations to respect the other’s rights in 
the resource.  Instead . . . we find on the environmental issue 
that the State and the Tribes must each take reasonable steps 
commensurate with the resources and abilities of each to 
preserve and enhance the fishery when their projects threaten 
then-existing harvest levels.103 
Although the panel responded by overturning what they called 
the imposition of an “environmental servitude,” they still held 
that the state, under certain circumstances, must take affirmative 
action to preserve and even enhance the tribes’ fisheries.104 
Upon a request for rehearing, however, the Ninth Circuit 
agreed to rehear the case.105  After the rehearing, the court, en 
banc, issued a per curiam opinion vacating both the district court 
opinion,106 as well as the opinion of the three-judge panel.107  
Although the court was “highly divided”108 on this issue, it 
determined that both the district court’s opinion and that of the 
 
101 United States v. Washington (Phase II Appeal), 694 F.2d 1374, 1375 (9th Cir. 
1982). 
102 See United States v. Washington (Culverts Opinion), No. C70-9213, 
Subproceeding No. 01-1, 2007 WL 2437166, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 22, 2007). 
103 Phase II Appeal, 694 F.2d at 1389 (emphasis added). 
104 Id. 
105 United States v. Washington (Phase II Appeal Rehearing), 759 F.2d 1353, 
1354 (9th Cir. 1985). 
106 Id., vacated, 506 F. Supp. 187 (W.D. Wash. 1980). 
107 Id., vacating, 694 F.2d 1374. 
108 United States v. Washington (Culverts Opinion), C70-9213, Subproceeding 
No. 01-1, 2007 WL 2437166, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 22, 2007). 
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panel, had weak factual accounts on which to base the 
imposition of an environmental duty to protect habitat, stating: 
We choose to rest our decision in this case on the proposition 
that issuance of the declaratory judgment on the 
environmental issue is contrary to the exercise of sound 
judicial discretion.  The legal standards that will govern the 
State's precise obligations and duties under the treaty with 
respect to the myriad State actions that may affect the 
environment of the treaty area will depend for their definition 
and articulation upon concrete facts which [sic] underlie a 
dispute in a particular case.  Legal rules of general applicability 
are announced when their consequences are known and 
understood in the case before the court, not when the subject 
parties and the court giving judgment are left to guess at their 
meaning.  It serves neither the needs of the parties, nor the 
jurisprudence of the court, nor the interests of the public for 
the judiciary to employ the declaratory judgment procedure to 
announce legal rules imprecise in definition and uncertain in 
dimension. . . . 
 The State of Washington is bound by the treaty.  If the State 
acts for the primary purpose or object of affecting or regulating 
the fish supply or catch in noncompliance with the treaty as 
interpreted by past decisions, it will be subject to immediate 
correction and remedial action by the courts.  In other 
instances, the measure of the State's obligation will depend for 
its precise legal formulation on all of the facts presented by a 
particular dispute.109 
Absent a specific factual account detailing a breach of a duty, the 
court refused to delineate what such a duty may entail, fearing 
its actions would sweep too broadly.110 
However, it might be said that the court did not reject the 
imposition of a duty, but merely postponed such imposition for a 
later date, when the parties could bring forth a more exact 
factual account on which to base a breach of that duty.111  
Interestingly, even though the court was divided on this issue, 
“[n]either the majority opinion, nor any of the dissenting or 
concurring opinions rejected the district court’s analysis on 
treaty-based obligations.”112  In fact, four of the dissenting judges 
 
109 Phase II Appeal Rehearing, 759 F.2d at 1357 (emphasis added). 
110 See id. at 1361. 
111 Id. at 1357. 
112 Culverts Opinion, 2007 WL 2437166, at *5 n.5. 
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would have affirmed the district court’s finding of a duty.113  
Specifically, Judge Nelson stated: 
I agree with the district court that the Tribes have an implicit 
treaty right to a sufficient quantity of fish to provide them with 
a moderate living, and the related right not to have the fishery 
habitat degraded to the extent that the minimum standard 
cannot be met.  I also agree that the State has a correlative duty 
to refrain from degrading or authorizing others to degrade the 
fish habitat in such a manner.114 
Consequently, the tribes and the federal attorneys found 
themselves faced with the decision of how to proceed with the 
case.  Would they be able to produce the “concrete facts” 
necessary to show the breach of a duty that was not “imprecise 
in definition and uncertain in dimension”?115 
3.  Culverts Subproceeding 
In 2001, sixteen years after the Ninth Circuit left open the 
door for tribes to produce a set of facts establishing a treaty-
based duty to protect fish habitat, the western Washington treaty 
tribes filed a request for determination with the U.S. District 
Court.116  The tribes sought three things: (1) a declaratory 
judgment establishing that the right of taking fish “imposes a 
duty upon the State of Washington to refrain from diminishing, 
through the construction or maintenance of culverts, . . . the 
number of fish that would otherwise return to or pass through” 
the tribes’ fishing grounds; (2) a prohibitory injunction 
requesting a prohibition on any state construction or 
maintenance of culverts that reduce the number of passing fish; 
and (3) a mandatory injunction requiring affirmative state action 
to identify and fix any culverts under state roads that diminish 
the number of passing fish within five years of the judgment.117 
The case was brought as a subproceeding under Phase II of 
United States v. Washington.  As previously, the tribes were 
 
113 Phase II Appeal Rehearing, 759 F.2d at 1365–70 (Nelson, J., dissenting; Norris, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part; Poole, J., dissenting) Judge Skopil was 
the fourth dissenting judge, joining in Judge Nelson’s opinion. 
114 Id. at 1367 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
115 Id. at 1357. 
116 Request for Determination, Culverts Opinion, 2007 WL 2437166 (W.D. Wash. 
Jan. 12, 2001). 
117 Id. at 6–7 (emphasis added). 
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seeking a declaratory judgment that the state had a duty to 
protect fish habitat.118  However, this time the tribes had been 
able to gather significant data showing that one specific state 
action–the construction and maintenance of culverts–had 
diminished the number of fish passing through the tribes’ usual 
and accustomed fishing grounds.119  The data used by the tribes 
had been developed by the Washington State Department of 
Transportation.120  Culverts that are correctly built and 
maintained do not block fish passage; however, culverts that 
have a blocked entrance, have excessive outlet velocity, or are 
too high off the water-level may completely block the passage of 
adult salmon returning to spawn and/or the out-migration of 
juvenile fish.121  The tribes cited state reports indicating that 
culverts belonging to the State of Washington impeded the 
production of two hundred thousand adult salmon annually.122  
By 2006, the state had identified six times as many blocking 
culverts as it had in the 1997 report.123 
In August of 2006, both the tribes and the State moved for 
summary judgment.124  The State argued that the tribes were 
trying to introduce a new treaty right into the Stevens Treaties: 
an implied servitude requiring affirmative action on the part of 
landowners.125  The tribes, however, argued that they were 
merely bringing a suit to enforce their right to take fish and to 
 
118 Id. at 1. 
119 See Tribal Brief in Opposition to State’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, 
Culverts Opinion, 2007 WL 2437166 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 27, 2006). 
120 Id. at 1–2. 
121 See Request for Determination, supra note 116, at 4; see also THOMAS H. 
KAHLER & THOMAS P. QUINN, UNIV. OF WASH., JUVENILE AND RESIDENT 
SALMONID MOVEMENT AND PASSAGE THROUGH CULVERTS 7 (1998), available at 
www.wsdot.wa.gov/research/reports/fullreports/457.1.pdf. 
122 Request for Determination, supra note 116, at 5. 
123 Plaintiff Tribes’ Motion and Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment at 10, Culverts Opinion, 2007 WL 2437166 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 
14, 2006). 
124 Plaintiff Tribes’ Motion and Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment, supra note 123; Washington’s Motion for Summary Judgment, 
and Argument in Support, Culverts Opinion, 2007 WL 2437166 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 
14, 2006). 
125 Washington’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and Argument in Support, 
supra note 124, at 1–2. 
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clarify the duty of the state as it relates to fish habitat.126  
Specifically, the tribes suggested that this litigation was merely a 
“particular fact context,” “brought in response to the direction 
of the Ninth Circuit to seek confirmation of the treaty right” to a 
protected fish habitat.127 
Judge Martinez agreed with the tribes that this subproceeding 
was merely the application of the Ninth Circuit’s previous ruling 
to a specific factual context, culverts, through which the tribes 
were re-asking a narrower version of the same question they had 
asked over twenty years prior: Does “the Tribes’ treaty-based 
right of taking fish impose[] upon the State a duty to refrain 
from diminishing fish runs by constructing or maintaining 
culverts that block fish passage”?128  As part of his opinion, Judge 
Martinez reviewed the case history of Phase II, noting that 
amidst the reversals at the Ninth Circuit, “nowhere in the 
majority opinion did the court state that no duty arises from the 
treaties.”129 
Finding that such a duty does in fact arise from the Stevens 
Treaties, Judge Martinez relied on the principles of Indian treaty 
construction, specifically that treaties with Indians should be 
construed broadly in the sense in which they would “naturally be 
understood by the Indians.”130  During treaty negotiations, 
Governor Stevens promised the tribes the right to take fish, not 
merely the right to fish.131  He also explained that they were not 
called upon to change their ways of living, only to confine their 
communities to one place.132  Moreover, Judge Martinez stated 
that it was “the government’s intent, and the Tribes’ 
understanding,” that they would be able to fish perpetually to 
meet their needs, so as not to become “a burden on the 
treasury.”133  This appears to be one of the most influential points 
of Judge Martinez’ decision: not only was it the tribes’ intent that 
 
126 Plaintiff Tribes’ Motion and Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment, supra note 123, at 2–3. 
127 Id. at 3. 
128 Culverts Opinion, 2007 WL 2437166, at *3. 
129 Id. at *5 n.5. 
130 Id. at *6 (quoting Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Fishing Vessel 
Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 676 (1979)). 
131 Id. at *8. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at *9. 
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they have perpetual fisheries, but the government’s as well.  This 
intent is evidenced by Stevens’ aim to keep the tribes off the 
federal bankroll134 and a statement made by Stevens at the Point 
Elliot Treaty council: “I want that you shall not have simply food 
and drink now but that you may have them forever.”135  
Furthermore, in the 1850s, the tribal fisheries of western 
Washington appeared inexhaustible, and it was not until forty 
years later that scientists began cautioning that salmon might not 
remain plentiful in perpetuity.136 
In this manner, the tribes were convinced to give up huge 
plots of land by the promise of perpetual access to this most 
important, sacred resource.137  Because the resource was in no 
need of protection at the time, the parties felt no need to 
explicitly include an environmental duty into the treaties.138  Such 
protection appeared unnecessary at the time.139  However, the 
promises made by Stevens only carried meaning if they included 
an implied promise that the government would never take 
actions that would degrade the resource.140 
Consequently, Judge Martinez held that the treaty language 
itself, along with the promises made by Stevens and the 
negotiators, imposed upon the state a duty to refrain from 
building or maintaining any culverts that act to block the passage 
of fish to or from the tribes’ traditional fishing places.141  
However, Martinez narrowly defined this duty and was careful 
to ensure that his holding fell within the requirements set forth 
by the Ninth Circuit,142 adding: 
This is not a broad ‘environmental servitude’ or the imposition 
of an affirmative duty to take all possible steps to protect fish 
runs as the State protests, but rather a narrow directive to 
refrain from impeding fish runs in one specific manner. . . . 
 
134 See id. at *8–9. 
135 Id. at *9 (quoting Declaration of Richard White) (emphasis added). 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at *10. 
138 Id. at *9. 
139 Id. at *10. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at *6. 
142 See, e.g., United States v. Washington (Phase II Appeal Rehearing), 759 F.2d 
1353 (9th Cir. 1985). 
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This duty . . . is necessary to fulfill the promises made to the 
Tribes . . . . 143 
C.  Implications 
There is little doubt that the Culverts Opinion is a milestone 
for tribal-rights advocates seeking greater environmental 
responsibility to be put on the shoulders of the state.  It has been 
hailed as a case of “incredible importance . . . for future 
generations.”144  It may very well be; only time will guarantee the 
accuracy of such a prediction.  However, it has significant 
limitations and its scope of applicability is narrow.  As noted 
above, Judge Martinez was careful to restrict the scope of his 
holding to enforce a duty not to construct culverts that block fish 
passage and limited his holding to the facts that were before the 
court.145  Therefore, this duty probably does not include a duty to 
refrain from polluting streams even though such activity may 
reduce numbers of fish.  Similarly, the duty probably does not 
encompass the destruction of fish habitat by state-licensed 
logging companies or the construction of dams.  It is a “narrow 
directive to refrain from impeding fish runs in one specific 
manner,” namely, the construction and maintenance of 
culverts.146 
This case can also be viewed as a stepping stone toward the 
establishment of either: (1) a broad duty, such as that originally 
established by the district court in Phase II, or (2) several narrow 
duties (such as this one) directed at specific activities that harm 
fish passage and habitat. 
This ruling will probably have significant impacts on the 
projects and budget of the Washington State Department of 
Transportation.  Due to this impact, it can be expected that the 
ruling will be appealed.  Unless it is reversed on appeal, it is 
likely that the tribes will rely upon the ruling and argue that it 
should be expanded to cover other environmental harms to fish 
and fish habitat. 
 
143 Culverts Opinion, 2007 WL 2437166, at *12. 
144 U.S. v. Washington Culverts Case, http://tribal-law.blogspot.com/2007/08/us-v 
-washington-culverts-case.html (Aug. 24, 2007). 
145 See Culverts Opinion, 2007 WL 2437166, at *12. 
146 Id. 
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II 
THE MISSING ANALYSIS: A PROPERTY-BASED CONSTRUCT 
This ruling has one significant weakness: its failure to analyze 
the state’s duty under a property-rights construct.  As noted 
above, tribal treaties are not only contracts but also deeds of 
property.147  These were no small deeds by any means.  Tribes 
ceded “millions of acres” in their treaties with the U.S. 
government.148  Therefore, failure to apply a property construct 
in a treaty-rights analysis is a failure to recognize the true nature 
of treaties: that tribes exchanged interests in property for their 
most valuable resource–fish. 
Most important to this analysis, however, is that tribes of 
western Washington did not only give up significant property 
rights, they also agreed to share certain property rights with the 
Territory (now State) of Washington.149  One of these rights is 
discussed here: the “right of taking fish.”150  This right was 
reserved to the tribes “in common with all citizens of the 
territory.”151 
Moreover, the weight of authority acknowledges that fishing 
rights are property rights and therefore subject to the rules of 
property law.152  The U.S. Supreme Court clarified that tribal 
property rights are of federal origin, and tribes can bring 
common law causes of action to vindicate those rights.153 
One property analysis that has been applied by the Ninth 
Circuit regarding the allocation issue but has yet to be tested in 
its application toward fish habitat protection, is the analogy of a 
cotenancy.  Because the right to take fish is a right reserved to 
the tribes “in common” with the state, it is a shared right.  
Although it may be true that neither party has ownership over 
the resource, the use of a cotenancy analogy is a helpful way to 
describe the relationship between the state, the tribes, and the 
 
147 Wood, supra note 8, at 36. 
148 United States v. Washington (Phase II Appeal Rehearing), 759 F.2d 1353, 
1366 (9th Cir. 1985). 
149 See Treaty of Medicine Creek, supra note 41. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
152 See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 1141 (Nell Jessup 
Newton ed., LexisNexis 2005) (1941); see also Wood, supra note 8, at 36. 
153 Wood, supra note 8, at 37–38. 
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fish.154  However, this analogy has only been applied when 
dealing with fish apportionment issues, never in regards to fish 
habitat protection.155  The reason often cited arguing against its 
application, as Judge Kennedy explained, is that the relationship 
between the state and the tribes does not meet all the 
requirements of a state common law tenancy-in-common or joint 
tenancy.156  However, it is not necessary that all of the formalistic 
requirements of state common law be met in order to apply the 
analogy.  This analogy is helpful because it provides both a duty 
as well as causes of action, such as waste and ouster, that can be 
applied to the fish habitat protection context.157  Because of the 
useful lessons and remedies that stem from a cotenancy analogy, 
courts should be willing to apply it as a property-based construct 
when dealing with a state’s or a tribe’s actions towards treaty 
fisheries. 
First, the relationship between states, tribes, and treaty 
fisheries is analogous to a cotenancy.158  The Ninth Circuit, in 
1978, called the relationship a “quasi-cotenancy,”159 due to the 
fact that it had some but not all of the common law attributes. 
Traditionally, under state common law, the term “cotenancy” is 
used to describe the relationship between common owners of 
property.160  Although there are several different forms of 
common ownership, the differences really only arise when one of 
the cotenants dies.161  While the owners are alive, they are all 
referred to as cotenants and have essentially the same rights and 
 
154 See United States v. Washington (Phase I Appeal), 520 F.2d 676, 685–86 (9th 
Cir. 1975).  The Ninth Circuit was careful to point out that “[t]he two groups of 
fishermen [did] not share a cotenancy in the fish,” but that “[n]evertheless, their 
relationship [was] analogous to a cotenancy.”  Id. 
155 See id.; see also United States v. Washington (Phase II Appeal), 694 F.2d 1374, 
1381 (9th Cir. 1982); Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass’n v. U.S. Dist. Court, 573 F.2d 
1123, 1128 n.3 (9th Cir. 1978).  But see Washington’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and Argument in Support, supra note 124, at 5–6 (arguing that the 
cotenancy analogy does not support the tribes’ case). 
156 See Puget Sound Gillnetters, 573 F.2d at 1134 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
157 Dale E. Kremer, Comment, The Inter Vivos Rights of Cotenants Inter Se, 37 
WASH. L. REV. 70, 76–79 (1962). 
158 Phase I Appeal, 520 F.2d at 685–86. 
159 Puget Sound Gillnetters, 573 F.2d at 1130. 
160 Kremer, supra note 157, at 70. 
161 Id. 
 514 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 23, 491 
responsibilities.162  Conferring common ownership (for example, 
conveyance of part and reservation of part) of the right to take 
fish, the Stevens Treaties use the language, “in common with” to 
signify such an outcome.163  Consequently, because the states and 
the tribes share this common ownership, one can call their 
relationship, “analogous to a cotenancy.”164 
Second, simply because the relationship between the states 
and tribes does not meet all the formal requirements of either a 
common law tenancy-in-common or joint tenancy does not mean 
that the cotenancy analogy cannot be applied.165  “Obviously, not 
all the rules of cotenancy in land can apply to an interest of the 
nature of a profit,” but that fact alone has been no barrier to 
courts using analogies to “explain[] the rights of the parties.”166  
Important to recognize is that common property law is state law, 
whereas Indian law is federal law, and is therefore not restrained 
by the complex intricacies of state common law.167  Moreover, 
federal Indian law is said to be sui generis, or unlike any other 
area of the law.168  This unique status leaves open the door for 
judicial creativity to apply analogous principles, such as those 
from the common law, to solve complex disputes. 
Prominent experts in this area agree: “[I]t is appropriate to 
draw upon property concepts for ‘foundational’ principles, 
though specific doctrines may not be wholly transferable in their 
 
162 See id. 
163 See United States v. Washington (Phase I Trial), 384 F. Supp. 312, 343 (W.D. 
Wash. 1974). 
164 United States v. Washington (Phase I Appeal), 520 F.2d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 
1975). 
165 See Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass’n v. U.S. Dist. Court, 573 F.2d 1123, 1128 n.3 
(9th Cir. 1978).  The court stated: 
We refer to the cotenancy analogy only because it is helpful in explaining the 
rights of the parties, not because all the rights and incidents of a common law 
cotenancy necessarily follow. . . . It is this equality of right between two quasi-
sovereigns which we expressed by analogy in the earlier case. 
Id. 
166 Id. 
167 See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832) (holding that federal 
law and not state law controls regulation of Indian affairs). 
168 Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty: 
The Trust Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1471, 1498 (1994). 
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entirety.”169  However, Judge Kennedy, who was serving on the 
Ninth Circuit at the time the “quasi-cotenancy” analogy was 
employed, failed to realize this when he rejected the idea of a 
cotenancy or quasi-cotenancy analogy.  Judge Kennedy rejected 
the idea simply because the parties do not have the “right to 
possess and use the entire” resource, whereas in a traditional 
cotenancy both parties have that right.170  Indian law is not so 
constrained; the majority of the court agreed with the use of the 
analogy.171  Simply because every common law attribute of a 
cotenancy is not met regarding the relationship between states 
and tribes, does not mean cotenancy remedies cannot be 
applied.172  For example, the Ninth Circuit, ruling on the 
apportionment issue in Phase I of United States v. Washington, 
analogized the state’s and tribes’ relationship to a cotenancy and 
indicated that its apportionment decision was essentially a 
“partition of the property” interest in catching fish.173  Partition is 
a remedy one member of a cotenancy can seek in order to 
protect his interest in the property.174  The court, specifically 
recognizing that the interest in the fish was not a cotenancy per 
se, still applied a cotenancy remedy to this analogous situation. 
Third, because this relationship is analogous to a cotenancy, 
causes of action such as waste and ouster should be applied to 
regulate state or tribal actions that degrade the fisheries.  
Cotenants have a fiduciary relationship toward one another.175  
Therefore, when one cotenant acts, it is subject to a duty of 
acting in a fiduciary capacity toward the other cotenants.176  In no 
context does this fiduciary relationship manifest itself more so 
than in the causes of action available to cotenants: waste and 
ouster. 
 
169 Wood, supra note 8, at 38 n.183 (citing Mary Christina Wood, Protecting the 
Attributes of Native Sovereignty: A New Trust Paradigm for Federal Actions 
Affecting Tribal Lands and Resources, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 109, 123–26 (1995)). 
170 Puget Sound Gillnetters, 573 F.2d at 1134 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
171 Id. at 1128 n.3. 
172 United States v. Washington (Phase I Appeal), 520 F.2d 676, 687 (9th Cir. 
1975). 
173 See id. 
174 See id. (citing Kremer, supra note 157, at 77). 
175 Kremer, supra note 157, at 70. 
176 See id. 
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A.  Waste 
Waste is usually described as “an abuse or destruction of 
property by one [cotenant] . . . resulting in a permanent injury to 
the inheritance.”177  Waste has occurred when one of the 
cotenants has overstepped the limitations of his property rights 
to the property.178  According to Judge Prager, two general kinds 
of waste exist: voluntary and permissive.179  Voluntary waste 
includes affirmative acts, while permissive waste includes the 
failure to perform necessary affirmative acts for the benefit of 
future cotenants.180  This is a great analogy to the tribal fisheries 
context.  When one of the cotenants to the resource acts in any 
way “inconsistent with the limitations” of his rights to the 
resource, he has committed waste.181  This could conceivably 
include overfishing, introducing fish-harming pollution, 
construction of fish-harming obstructions such as culverts and 
dams, and any other significant destruction of the resource. 
B.  Ouster 
Ouster is another cause of action available to cotenants.  It is 
defined as “the act of one cotenant in depriving the other 
cotenant of his rights” with respect to the common property 
interest.182  One act that constitutes ouster is the denial of access 
to the other cotenants of the shared property.183  Usually, the 
question of whether one cotenant’s acts constitute ouster is a 
question for a jury to decide.184  This cause of action provides 
again, like waste, some interesting remedies for tribes whose 
treasured resources are harmed in such a way as to make it 
impossible for them to access that resource.  For example, if any 
acts of the state either permit or cause pollution to diminish the 
level of fish such that tribes are denied “access” to their fisheries, 
 
177 Id. at 76. 
178 Id. 
179 JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND 
PRACTICES 556 (Aspen Publishers 4th ed. 2006) (1993). 
180 Id. 
181 Kremer, supra note 157, at 76. 
182 Id. at 78. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
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the tribes would have a cause of action for ouster against the 
state. 
Both waste and ouster are creative and time-tested causes of 
action for damage to a shared property interest.  Because the 
relationship between tribes and states with regards to treaty 
fisheries is analogous to a cotenancy, these causes of action 
should be used in effecting remedies for state degradation of 
tribes’ right to take fish as secured by tribal treaties. 
III 
CONCLUSION 
Over the next several decades, the issues confronted within 
the United States v. Washington litigation will probably continue 
to appear before adjudicators.  Courts must be willing to be 
creative in how they analyze and tackle issues in the Indian law 
realm.  Specifically, when dealing with shared resources between 
states and tribes, courts should employ property-based rules and 
constructs in addition to their traditional contract-based tools to 
interpret treaties.  This is not a new idea.  The Ninth Circuit 
began applying the cotenancy analogy to interpret treaty fishing 
rights in Phase I, even going as far as to say, in dicta, that states 
should not allow the fisheries to be degraded.185  But this analogy 
later disappeared in the Phase II and Culverts litigations, as the 
court opted to only analyze the state’s duties under traditional 
contract law analysis. 
A contract law analysis, by itself, is incomplete because it only 
considers the duties and rights that arise out of the treaty in 
conjunction with the law of contracts.  What it fails to include 
are the duties and rights that flow out of the deed of property 
that exists within the treaty.  As such, the Culverts Opinion fails 
to fully encompass the duties and rights that arise out of the 
analogous cotenancy relationship the state has with the tribes.  
As Professor Mary Christina Wood states: “It is imperative that 
courts construe treaties . . . by applying principles derived from 
this common [property] law framework.”186  Indian law is “new” 
law in the Anglo-American context–it has no exact analogue 
 
185 See United States v. Washington (Phase I Appeal), 520 F.2d 676, 687 (9th Cir. 
1975). 
186 Wood, supra note 8, at 38. 
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and there is little guiding precedent.187  However, the common 
property law has traditionally been available for this exact 
purpose: responding to new and changing conditions. 
 The very essence of the common law is flexibility and 
adaptability.  It does not consist of fixed rules, but is the best 
product of human reason applied to the premises of the 
ordinary and extraordinary conditions of life, as from time to 
time they are brought before the courts. . . . If the common law 
should become so crystallized that its expression must take on 
the same form whenever the common law system prevails, 
irrespective of physical, social, or other conditions peculiar to 
the locality, it would cease to be the common law of history, 
and would be an inelastic and arbitrary code.  It is one of the 
established principles of the common law, which has been 
carried along with its growth, that precedents must yield to the 
reason of different or modified conditions.188 
Courts today should be willing to apply a property-based 
construct along with traditional treaty interpretation rules in 
deciphering whether a state or tribe has acted in accord with its 





188 In re Hood River, 227 P. 1065, 1086–87 (Or. 1924) (emphasis added). 
